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sell, or if it is only an authority to
sell without any direction, then the
land retains its character as land
until it is actually sold. If the
directions of the will, as to proceeds, require a sale, it is equivalent to a positive direction to sell,
and the land is deemed personal
property from the death of the testator. In this case the executor
was not directed, nor required to
sell, except so far as a sale was
necessary for the purpose of paying debts and the legacies directed
to be paid. As to the rest, it was a
mere power which he could exercise or not at his discretion, and
therefore the land must be considered as having retained its character as land until actual sale.
When land for certain purposes
is required to be converted into,
money, and in the sale more is sold
than is required for these purposes,
the excess of proceeds will be con-

sidered as land: Oberle v. Lerch,
iS N. J. Eq., 346.
The rules, as shown by the cases
above digested, seems to-be adopted
universally throughout the United
States: See Holland v. Cruft, 3
Gay (Mass.), 162; Hammond v.
Putnam, Iio Mass., 23-2; Perkins
v. Coghlan, 148 Mass.; Dodge v.
Williams, 64 Wis., 70; Expfarte
McBee, 63 N. C., 332; Loftus v.
Glass, x5 Ark., 68o; Pratt v. Taliaferro, 3 Leigh (Va.), 419; James v.
Thockmorton, 57 Cal., 368: Ferguson v. Stuart's Ex., 14 Ohio, i4o;
Smithers v. Hooper, 23 Md., 273.
It is the adopted rule that conversion will be effected where,
either from the will itself or from
the circumstances of any particular
case, the intention of the testator
clearly appears to be that a sale
shall be made, either at once, or at
some fixed time in the future.
J. HowARD RJEOADS.
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Charity-Perpetuity.
A charitable trust taking effect on a remote contingency in derogation of another charity, even though it involves a change of trustee, is
valid. In Pennsylvania, under Act of May 9, 1889, P. L., 173, a gift to
a charity is not void although it transgresses the rule against perpetuities.
PER CURIAM, affirming PINROSE J., of the Orphans' Court, Philadelphia Co., reported 154 Pa. St., 209.

GIFTS TO

CHARITIES

GIFTS TO CHARITIES AND THE
The proper application of the
rule against perpetuities to charitable devises and bequests has given
rise to some interesting litigation.
It has been said that the question
of remoteness may occur in connection with charitable trusts in
three ways: First, where there is
a gift to 4 charity followed by a
remote gift to an individual; second, a gift to an individual followe'd by a remote gift to a charity;
and third, a gift to a charity followed by a remote gift to another
charity: Gray on Perpetuities,
592. To which may be added a
fourth class, where there is an exe
cutory devise to a charity to take
effect upon a contingency possibly
remote.
The first two classes have always
been regarded as subject to the rule
against perpetuities, and need no
discussion: Company of Pewterers
v. Christ Hospital, I Vern., i61;
Merrit v. Bucknam, 77 Me., 253;
Theological Society v. Atty-Gen.,
135 Mass., 285; Commissioners v.
De Clifford, I Dr. & W., 245. But
it is to be remembered that where
the object of the- charitable trust
has ceased to exist, a clause restoring the property to the family of
the testator has been held good:
Atty-Gen. v. Pyle, I Atk., 435;
Walsh v. The Secretary, io H. L.
Ca., 367; Randell v. Dixon, 38
Ch. D., 213.
The third, and to a limited extent the fourth class, have been
regarded as free from objection on
the ground of remoteness, an exception worth consideration. To
do this it is necessary to examine
the purpose of the rule itself. If
the object of the rule is to prevent
perpetual holdiug, if "the ability
to alienate" is the test, then no
logical objection can be made to
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the exception. If a perpetuity has
no other meaning than "an inalienable, indestructible interest,"
then it is but a natural sequence
that the policy of the law, which
permits the creation of charitable
trusts for the purpose of holding
property forever, should also. protect them from such rules as would
defeat that policy. If, on the other
hand, the rule against perpetuities
is, as Mr. GRAY states, directed not
to preventing the alienation of
present interests, but against the
creation of remote future interests,
the exception loses its logical consistency, and is open to the objections that are always to be urged
against purely arbitrary rules, however great their seeming utility.
It is universally conceded that
Mr. GRAY has stated the rule
against perpetuities correctly, and
in all cases involving private interests it will be found that the courts
have made the time of vesting the
controllfig feature. But in cases
of charities unconnected with private interests the courts have set
aside this view and have based their
reasoning upon the theory that the
rule is directed against perpetual
holding, thus involving the rule in
an ambiguity distressing to accurate thinkers.
The cases discussing this subject
are not numerous. The first of
sufficient importance to merit attention is, The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. AttyGen., 3 Russ., 142. Atestator, dying in 1715, directed hib executors
to pay the Society one thousand
pounds, after the consecration of
two Protestant bishops, one for the
continent and one for the islands
of North America, the income in
the meantime to be applied for the
benefit of missionaries of the So-
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ciety. When in 1824 the bishops
were appointed the fund was
awarded to the Society with little
discussion, as there were practically no conflicting claims.
The whole question, however,
was raised in Christ's Hospital v.
Grainger, 16 Sim., 83; I MacN. &
G., 460; i H. & Tw., 533, properly
regarded as the leading case. Property has been devised to the corporation of Reading upon charitable trusts, with a proviso that if
the corporation should fail to perform its duties as trustee for one
year, the property should go to
the corporation of London for the
benefit of Christ's Hospital. The
corporation failed to perform its
duties as trustee, and the question
was upon the validity of the gift
over. Since property held for
charitable purposes is forever inalienable, the lord chancellor reasoned, the rule against perpetuities
did not apply. The property was
neither more nor less alienable because given from one charity to
another. "Here," says Mr. GRAY,
"with submission to so great an

authority (Lord

COTTgNHAM)

is

the common confusion between
perpetuity in the sense of inalienability and perpetiuity in the sense
And, although
of remoteness."
the decision has long stood as
authoritative, be would have it examined with a view to its rejection
in any jurisdiction where the matter is not closed.
English writers have not felt
called upon to offer objections to
the ruling: Marsden on Perpetuities, 295; Tyssen on Charitable Bequests, 423; re Coinington's Will,
8 W. R., 444. And the decision
has met with approval in a recent
case in the Court of Appeals: In re
Tyler (1891), 3 Ch., 252. Testator
5
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gave a fund to trustees of the London Missionary Society, and committed the keys of his family vault
in Highgate Cemetery to their
charge, the same to be lbept in
good repair. Failing to comply
with this request, the money to go
The
to the Blue Coat School.
society, although willing to comply with wishes of the testator, objected to having the gift clogged
with such a condition, contending
with great justice that it would enable the testator to do indirectly
that which he could not do directly,
namely, to create a perpetual trust
for a non-charitable object. The
court, however, thought the case
fell directly within the principle
upon which Christ's Hospital v.
Grainger (supra) was dqcided.
And as to the suggestion that it
would open the way to evasions of
the law, it was thought that the
decision would not go to the length
of holding "that one could get out
of the rule against perpetuities by,
making a charity a trustee." That,
said the court would be absurd.
Much was said about the comparatively harmless nature of the condi-,
tion attached to the bequest; but,
though harmless, it was none the
less for a private purpose, and
renders it difficult to decide where
the line is to be drawn.
Where the gift is for the establishment of a charity, subject to a
condition precedent, such, for example, as a gift of land for a site,
the court has not subjected such
gifts to the rule against remoteness,
but has laid down the general
principle that all such conditions
must be fulfilled within rbasonable time. This applies only where
the gift is immediately and entirely devoted to charity. If personal estate is once effectively
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given to charity, it is taken out of
the scope of the law of remoteness.
But if the gift in trust for charity
is itself conditional upon a future
and uncertain event, it is regarded
as subject to the same rules and
principles as any other estate depending for its coming into existence upon a condition precedent:
Synnett v. Herbert L. R., 7 Ch.,

THE

tentions, will he distrusted. To
fairly test the rule, it would be
necessary for the point to arise in
a suit by one charity to obtain the
benefit of the gift over, upon the
happening of the remote contingency which is to divest the
previous charitable gift.
The decision in Christ's Hospital v. Grainger met with appr6val
in Odell v. Odell, io Allen, i. Here
232.
In Chamberlayne v. Brockett, the trust was for the accumulation
L. R., 8 Ch., 2o6, there was a gift of income for fifty years, and then
to charity. Justice GRAY, in refor the erection of alms houses
"when and so soon as land shall viewing the authorities, made parat any time be given for the pur- ticular mention of the leading case.
pose." The master of the rolls Seven years later the same distinthought the gift void for remote- guished jurist had occasion to conness, inasmuch as it was dependent
sider this question, then before the
upon an event which might not
United States Supreme Court: The
arise for an indefinite time. The will in dispute directed that in case
lord chancellor thought that there the institutions named as beneficiaries attempted to alienate the
was an immediate gift for charity.
property devised, the executors
The case in re White's Trusts is a
complete illustration of the work- were to enter and repossess the
ing of the rule. Testator left a property, and in that event the
fund for the erection of alms property was devised to an orphad
houses when a proper site could asylum: Jones v. Habersham, 107
be obtained.' The gift was held U.S., 174. The Court could not
good if the site were provided: 30 see how the next of kin could be
W. R., 837; but the trustees failing benefited whether the devise- over
to obtain a site within reasonable
were void or valid, but stated that
time, it was held that the legacy "as an estate is no more perpetual
lapsed: 33 Ch. D., 449.
in two successive charities than in
The rule in Christ's Hospital v. one charity, and as the rule against
Grainger has been quoted with ap- perpetuities does not apply to charproval in the American courts, but
ities, it follows that if a gift is
the question has seldom been
made to one charity and then over
directly raised. In the majority of to another charity 'upon the hapinstances the contest has been be- pening of a 'contingency which
tween the heirs-at-law and the ex- may or may not take place within
ecutors, or testamentary trustees. the limit of that rule, the limitaUnder such circumstances the na- tion over to the second charity is
tural inclination of a court will be good."
in favor of sustaining the charitThe statement in the opinion
able intentions of the testator, and
that "the rule against perpetuities
arguments which are calculated to does not apply to charities" was
restrict or perhaps defeat such inincautious.
That it does apply
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to a limited extent was recognized in Russell v. Allen, 107 U. S.,
163, where a rule was adopted that

has been widely quoted, "a gift
for a charity not existing at the
date of the gift, and the beginning
of whose existence is uncertain, or
which is to take effect upon a contingency which may possibly not
happen within a life or lives in being and twenty-one years afterwards is valid provided there is no
gift of the property meanwhile to
or for the benefit of any private
corporation or persdn." The language of the Court may have referred to those cases only where
the gift is to a non-existent charity, or to a charity upon the happening of a possibly remote contingency without a previous gift.
But the rule has been extended
equally to those cases where the
gift is from one charity over to another: Stoors Agricultural School
v. Whitney, 54 Conn., 342.

The question then arises, -what
is meant by an immediate gift
to charity from this point of
,view? The courts of Connecticut have been compelled to answer this question. In Jocelyn
v. Nott, 44 Conn., 55, the gift was

to trustees, directing that if any
Congregational church should desire to erect a meeting-house upon
the land devised, and the trustees
should be satisfied that the church
was able to complete the same free
from debt, the trustees were to convey the land to the church. "The
devise," said the Court, "is vested
only in the trustees, and no interest whatever has as yet vested in
the party intended to be benefited,
and as such an interest may never
vest, the devise tends to create a
perpetuity in the trustees and vest
in them property which for all

time to come may remain inalienable. This the law will not allow."
On the other hand, in Woodruff v.
March, 26 A., 846 (Conn.), testator left his residuary estate to
trustees for the establishment of a
school, providing certain lands and
buildings in W be given free of

cost for a location of the school.
The court found in other parts of

the will an intention to limit this
proviso to the period of twenty

years; but conceding that there
was no such intention, the gift to
the trustees was an immediate gift
to charity, and should the land not
be given within a reasonable time
the intenued purpose of the trust
might fail, but it would be by the
non-performance of a condition
subsequent. See also New Haven
Institute v. New Haven, 6o Conn.,
32.

In Pennsylvania, the views of
the Supreme Court, as expressed
in the earlier cases, were not in
harmony with Christ's Hospital v.
Grainger. but in the long interval
of time that elapsed before it became necessary to pass upon the
question these views underwent a
change. In Hilliard v. Miller, the
devise was to certain church corporations to lend the income from
the fund to young farmers and
mechanics in loans secured by
mortgages, and if the income
should accumulate beyond the application for loans, then to apply
the income to the erection of a
hospital. it was decided that the
first trust was not a charity, and,
therefore, an illegal accumulation,
and that since the. gift to the hospital was not immediate, and might
not vest within the legal period, it
also fell: io Pa. St., 326.
While this is the only early case
bearing directly on the question,
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the words of the Chief Justice in
Philadelphia v. Girard's Heirs are
worth noting in this connection.
The facts need not be mentioned
as the Court went somewhat out of
its way in discussing the subject.
"Suppose," it was said, "that
some of the directions given for
the management of the Charity are
conditions upon which a new
charity is depending, they would,
therefore, on the showing of the
claimants here, be void conditions
of the new charity, because they
may not happen within the time
allowed forthe vesting of executory
devises, and, therefore, could not
divest the already vested charity.
Their character is such as to avoid
rather the substitutionary charities
than the principal and vested one:"
45 Pa. St, 29. It can hardly be
doubted that a court expressing
such views would, if a case had
then arisen, have rendered a decision adverse to Christ's Hospital v.
Grainger.
Time has wrought a change in
the views of the courts, and it is
not surprising to find to-day a
sentiment overwhelmingly in favor
of aiding and upholding charitable
bequests by the use of every rule
of construction that can reasonably
be turned to their advantage. In
the case of Franklin's E3state, xSo
Pa. St., 437, testator bequeathed
£Iooo to the city of Philadelphia
in trust to let out the same to young
married artificers, and at the end of
terms in gross of ioo and 200 years
the fund with accumulations to go
to the city and State for designated
charitable purposes. It was urged
on behalf of the petitioners, the
representatives of the residuary
legatee, that Christ's Hospital v.
Grainger was not law in Pennsylvania.
Conceding that the first

gift was non-charitable and also
that a contingent gift to a nonexisting charity -beyond the period
allowed by the rule against perpetuities is void, the Orphans'
Court could not see how this would
favor the petitioners. "The gift,
though its application for the purpose ultimately intended was deferred, was immediate, and the
beneficiary was itself the trustee:"
27 W. N. C, 545.
In the Supreme Court the appeal
was dismissed on a question of
jurisdiction, and in consequence
the matter was brought before the
Common Pleas Court, 2 Pa. Dist.,
435Passing over Hilliard v. Miller,
supra, where a strikingly similar
trust was characterized as "a loan
office in the garb of a charity,"
the bequest for the aid of the young
married artificers was held a good,
charitable gift, and that on the
whole Dr. Franklin's will "established in legal form three valid,
benevolent and beneficial charities,
neither one of which is vulnerable
when assaulted upon any of*the
grounds which were argued before,
us." While admitting that Philadelphia v. Girard's Heirs (supra)
correctly stated some of the objections to a perpetuity, the Court
declared that "the greater objection is the accumulation of a large
fund in individual hands, thereby
creating a -menace to the community." The danger arising from
accumulations did not disturb the
courts until long after the rule

against perpetuities was settled law:
Thellusson Act, 39 George III, c.
98. Objections on the ground of unlawful accumulation and objections
on the ground of remoteness have
always been treated as entirely distinct when historically considered.
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shall fail for want of a trustee or
So that if this opinion is literally
adopted it will certainly add a new by reason of the objects ceasing,
feature to the rule against remote- or depending upon the discretion
of a last trustee, or in excess of the
ness.
In Lennig's Estate, 154 Pa. St.,
annual value limited bylaw; but
209, the case annotated, the Court,
it shall be the duty of any court
having equity jurisdiction in the
in discussing Christ's Hospital v.
Grainger, points out that the case proper county, to supply a trustee
is much stronger in favor of the and by its decrees carry into effect
ultimate charity where there is no
the intent of the donor or testator
change of trustees. But "whatever
so far as the same can be ascertained
may be said of the soundness of and carried into effect consistently
the reasoning of Lord COT'uNuAM,
with law or equity subject to an
by whom the opinion was delivered,
appeal as in other cases, etc."
the question it would seem is no
The courts of New York having
longer an open one in Pennsyl- rejected the common-law doctrines
vania, where the legislature has regarding charities, have placed
come to the relief of the judiciary
the law of charitable bequests upon
by passing the Act of May 9th,
a basis radically different from that
1889, P. L., 173, which in the most
of England: Bascom v. Albertson,
unequivocal terms declares that a
34 N. Y., 584; Holland v.Alcock,
gift for a charity shall not fail be- io8 N. Y., 312. The valiaity of
cause transgressive of the rule trusts, therefore, for objects which
against perpetuities."
The act the English law describes as chatcited adds little to that of i85s, itable, are in New York governed
P. L., 33r, which designed to extend by the same rules, by which the
the cy fires doctrine in Pennsyl- validity of trusts for private purvania, Bisphain's Equity (5th ed.) poses are determined. In every
p. 197, n. 5, was not appealed to
case the vesting must take place
in questions of remoteness: Roger's within two lives in being at the
Estate, 43 Leg. Int., 292. And it time of testator's death : Cottman
might naturally have been inferred
v. Grace, 112 N. Y., 299. The obthat the Acts of 1885, P. L., 259, jection is not to the perpetual
and of 1889, P. L., 173, -were holding of property, for a gift to a
"merely auxiliary to and in aid of
duly incorporated charitable instithe purposes of the former acts tution, for the purposes of its creaupon the same subject:" Pepper's tion, is perfectly good: Holmes v.
Estate, 154 Pa. St., 33r. The judi- Mead, 52 N. Y., 332; In re Strickcial interpretation of the act, how- land's Estate, 17 N. Y. Supplement,
ever, is final: Lewis' Estate, x Dist.
304.
Rep., r48, and the rule against perThe chief difficulty has arisen in
petuities practically eliminated
the case of a bequest to a corporafrom the law of charitable bequests
tion non-existent at thd time of tesin Pennsylvania. The act is as
tator's death. If the will expressly
follows:
provides that the corporation must
SEcTIoN x.-" Be it enacted,etc., be created within the period alThat no disposition of property
lowed for the vesting of future
heretofore or hereafter made for
estates, the gift is valid: Shipman
any religious or. charitable use
v. Robbins, 98 N. Y., 3rn; Burrill
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v. Boardman, 43 N. Y., 254. In the
latter case the testator provided for
the establishment of a hospital, to
be incorporated within two years
after testator's death, provided two
lives named in his will should continue so long. The decision in
favor of the validity of this gift
was regarded as "a pronounced
departure from what was supposed
to be the rule governing charitable
bequests :" People v. Simonson,
126 N. Y., 299, and the conditions
of the law are to be strictly maintained. In Cruishank v. Home of
the Friendless, 113 N. Y., 337, the
executqrs were to apply as soon as
practicable to the legislature for-an
act incorporating the institution.
The trust was held incapable of
being sustained for'the reason that
the incorporation was dependent
upon the will of the legislature, and
the-period of delay contingent upon
the action of the State was not
measured by lives: Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N. Y., 215 ; Tilden
v. Green, i3o N. Y., 29.
With the law so adverse to gifts
for haritable purposes it seems
hardly possible that the question of
a gift over fro i one charity to another, upon a remotd contingency,
could be raised in New York. The
point, however, has been alluded to
in one of the inferior courts: In re
Williams' Estate, x Misc. Rep., N.
Y., 44o. The bequest was to trustees, to apply the income from the
fund to the payment of the salary
of the pastor of a church, subject
to the condition that, if ever the
said church should become extinct,
the trustees were to turn over the
amount'held in trust to the Board
of Church Extension. This last
gift over, the Court remarked, "was
hopelessly bad, and no attempt was
made on the argument to defend
it."

The will construed in the case of
Judevine v. Judevine, 6I Vt., 589,
contains clauses that might have
called for explanation if the question of remoteness had been raised.
A trust-fund was set apart for the
education of deserving young men,
and at any time after five years
from testator's decease the executors mightin theirdiscretion appropriatewhat remained to the towns
of C and H for school purposes. A
codicil provided, "should either
town, or both, neglect to carry out
the provisions set forth by me, the
fund delivered and paid to such
town by my executor is to be col-.
lected from such town and placed
in some other town that will carry
out my desires." As the court did
notfind it necessary to refer to this
last clause, it must be presumed
that no difficulty was presented to
its mind in regard to the remoteness of thegift over to the unnamed
towns.
Although technical objections
may be urged against the ruling in
Christ's Hospital v. Grainger, based
as it is said to be upon a misconception of the purpose of the rule
against perpetuities, it is far from
likely that it ever will be disturbed.
It is always, of course, more satisfactory when legal conclusions are
drawn from clear, true, and unambiguous premises, but the precedent
has been found useful and convenient for citation, * those conflicts
where the charitable intentions of
the testator are opposed by the
claims of collaterals. If it is to be
the policy of the law that charitable
gifts are to be favored to the greatest possible extent, then the rule

azainst perpetuiti z must yield to
that policy.
War. HnNRY LoYD, JR.

